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Abstract. We consider a discrete time, pure exchange infinite horizon economy
with n ≥ 2 consumers and  ≥ 1 consumption goods per period. Within the
framework of decentralized mechanisms, we show that for any given consump-
tion trade at any period of time, say at time one, the consumers will need in
general an infinite dimensional (informational) space to identify such a trade as
an intertemporal Walrasian one. However, we show a set of environments where
the Walrasian trades at each period of time can be achieved as the equilibrium
trades of a sequence of decentralized competitive mechanisms, using only both
current prices and quantities to coordinate decisions.
JEL classification: D51, D91
Key words: Walrasian allocation, informational decentralization, mechanism
design
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the question concerning the information that is needed
by agents to identify an intertemporal Walrasian trade allocation at a given period
of time . The question is answered within the theoretical framework of decen-
tralized resource allocation mechanisms (or processes), following the pioneering
work of Hurwicz (1960), and Mount and Reiter (1974).
The economy is a discrete time infinite horizon pure exchange economy, with
n ≥ 2 consumer agents, and  ≥ 1 consumption goods at each period of time.
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Each agent is characterized by a positive infinite sequence of initial endowments,
and a utility function (i.e. the discounted sum of the one period utility function)
which is defined on the set of all uniformly bounded infinite sequences of non-
negative − tuples of real numbers (i.e. the consumption space)
For an economy with only two agents and one good at each time, we take as
a social goal the Walrasian correspondence at time one, which assigns the Wal-
rasian trade that the two agents make at time one. This means that the allocation
space is just the Cartesian plane. For this set of simple economies we show that
any informationally decentralized resource allocation process that realizes such
a correspondence (i.e. identifies Walrasian trades at time one) must have at least
a message space as large as (i.e. with dimension equivalent to ) the set of all
sequences taking values in the interval [0, 1], which is an infinite dimensional
space. This result is formally stated in Theorem 4.3 and it can be interpreted in
the following way. Suppose that we observe two agents engaged in trading at a
period of time, and suppose that each of them only knows his own characteristics
(i.e. his endowment sequence and utility function), which is the basic assumption
of informational decentralization. The previous result implies that, from a theo-
retical point of view, to verify whether or not such a trade is an intertemporal
Walrasian trade, we need to have a model, together with an equilibrium concept,
which requires a transmission of information between each agent which involves
an infinite number of linearly independent variables. Another way to interpret
that result, within the framework of the traditional intertemporal Arrow-Debreu
paradigm, is that at the starting date of the economy all present and future mar-
kets must neccesarily be open for all commodities in order to reach the agents
an equilibrium trade for any given particular period of time. In other words, all
agents need to know all equilibrium trades and prices for all periods of time to
be sure that they reach an equilibrium trade at some particular time.
When the social goal is the Pareto efficient correspondence, a similar result
is obtained by Hurwicz and Weinberger (1990), where it is considered a Cass-
Koopmans-Ramsey economy with one consumer, one producer and one produced
good per period. There, it is shown that to identify, at time one, Pareto efficient
allocations it is needed a non-finite dimensional informational space. We should
notice, that in the Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey economies considered by Hurwicz
and Weinberger there is a unique Pareto optimal allocation which coincides with
the Walrasian one. Therefore, the Hurwicz and Weinberger result holds, equiva-
lently, both for the intertemporal Walrasian and the Pareto efficient social goal at
time one. Hence, we may also consider our result as an extension of the Hurwicz
and Weinberger’s to pure exchange economies for the Walrasian correspondence
case. However, such results are no longer true for the Pareto correspondence
case, for pure exchange economies, as it is shown in Manresa (1995). In effect,
to verify whether or not a trade allocation is intertemporal Pareto efficient at
some period of time, agents only need to transmit a finite number of variables
at that time, that is prices and quantities, which in general do not constitute an
intertemporal Walrasian equilibrium.
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Although the previous results hold for convex standard environments, here we
can show and characterize a particular class of environments where a sequence
of informationally decentralized competitive mechanisms, defined on the corre-
sponding current period environments, and acting at each time by using current
prices and quantities, yields equilibrium outcomes which are fully intertemporal
Walrasian trades. Such a result allows us to identify those economies for which
a lifetime budget constraint for any consumer offers the same restriction as a
sequence of those constraints, each for a period of time. The result can be found
in Theorem 4.4 and its Corollary, and it is similar in spirit to that obtained by
Bala et al. (1991) for aggregate intertemporal production economies, with one
consumer living forever and one firm at each period of time. In that paper, a
sequence of mechanisms, which constitute what is called an evolutionary one,
yields at each time productive efficient allocations of consumption and stocks
of capital which maximizes the long run average of one period utilities from
consumption, but not the discounted sum of utilities, which is the social goal of
the present and Hurwicz and Weinrberger’s paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the econ-
omy, and we introduce basic definitions an assumptions. In Sect. 3 we present
some standard concepts and results from the theory of decentralized mechanisms,
while Sect. 4 contains the main results of the paper (Theorems 4.3, 4.4 and, 4.6).
An Appendix gathers the proof of the results.
2 The economy, pareto optimal, individually rational,
and Walrasian allocations
We consider an infinite horizon pure exchange economy starting at t = 1, with
 ≥ 1 non-storable consumption goods at each period of time, xt ∈ R+. There
are n agents, i = 1, 2, ..., n , each of them characterized by an initial endowment
sequence wi = (wi1, wi2, ..., wit , ...), wit ∈ R+ and by a utility function
V i (x i ) =
∞∑
t=1
ait u
i (x it ), i = 1, 2, ..., n
where x i = (x i1, x i2, ..., x it , ...) is a non-negative sequence of consumption goods
for the i th agent, ai = (ai1, ai2, ..., ait , ...) is a positive summable sequence of real
numbers, called discount factors, and ui : R+ → R is his time period utility or
felicity function.
The commodity space is the set of all sequences of -tuples of real numbers,
denoted by Rw, and the consumption space is the set of all non-negative elements
of Rw, denoted by Rw+ . Both spaces are endowed with the product topology,
inherited from the usual Euclidean topology on R. Thus, each agent can be
identified with the triple of characteristics,
ei = (ai , ui , wi ) ∈ E i , i = 1, 2, ..., n
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and E i is considered the set of all possible characteristics for i . The set of
all possible economies is E = E 1 × ... × E n , and an economy is denoted by
e = (e1, e2, ..., en ) ∈ E . With each economy e we associate the set of all feasible
trade allocations for e,
F (e) = {z = (z 1, ..., z n ) ∈ Rw × · · · × Rw : z 1 + ... + z n = 0˜, and z i =
x i − wi , for some x i ∈ Rw+ , i = 1, 2, ..., n}
where z i = (z i1 , z i2 , ..., z it , ...) is an infinite sequence of trades for the i − th agent,
and 0˜ = (0˜1, 0˜2, ..., 0˜t , ...), denotes the infinite zero sequence1. We will denote by
F (E ) the set of all possible feasible net trades for some economy e ∈ E . The
Pareto interior correspondence, denoted by P+ : E → F (E ), is defined, as usual,
as:
P+(e) = {z ∈ F (e) : V i (z i + wi ) ≥ V i (z i + wi ), i = 1, 2, ..., n, and
with strict inequality for some i , imply z = (z 1, ..., z n ) /∈ F (e); and
z i + wi 	 0˜}.
A trade allocation ẑ = (ẑ 1, ..., ẑ n ) ∈ F (e) is called individually rational
whenever
V i (ẑ i + wi ) ≥ V i (wi ), i = 1, 2, ..., n.
We make the following assumptions on the environments:
(A.1)We write w1t + ... + wnt = wt , t = 1, 2, ..., and we assume that for
each i , a <
∣∣wit ∣∣ < b, where 0 < a < b <∞, t = 1, 2, ....
(A.2) For each i , ui is a continuous utility function on R+, twice con-
tinuously differentiable in R++, and strictly concave. Moreover, we as-
sume that its partial derivatives2 are strictly positive (i.e. for x ∈ R++,
Dk ui (x ) > 0), Dk ui (xt ) → ∞ as xtk → 0, and
∑
k=1
Dk ui (x )xk < c, for xk
∈ (0, d ), c, d < +∞ .
Without changing notation we still let E be the set of economies satisfying
(A.1) and (A.2). Under this assumptions it is known (see Kehoe and Levine 1985)
that z = (z 1, ..., z n ) ∈ P+(e) if and only if there exist some real numbers αi > 0,
i = 1, 2, ..., n such that {z 1 + w1, ..., z n + wn} solves the program:
Max{α1V 1(z 1 + w1) + ... + αnV n (z n + wn )}
s.t . (i ) z it + wit ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ...n; t = 1, 2, ...,
(ii ) z 1t + ... + z nt = 0˜t , t = 1, 2, ......
1 Given x , x ′ ∈ Rw, we define as ussual, x ′′ = x + x ′ if and only if x ′′t = xt + x ′t for all t . We
also define the following inequalities: x ≥ x ′ ⇔ xt ≥ x ′t for all t ,
x > x ′ ⇔ xt ≥ x ′t and x /= x ′.
x  x ′ ⇔ xt > x ′t all t .
2 The partial derivative of u(·) at x with respect to the k − variable is denoted by Dk u(x ), while
the vector of partial derivatives of u(·) at x is denoted by Du(x ).
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Furthermore, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions satisfied by any
interior solution to the previous program is:
(P .1) αi ait Dui (z it + wit ) = qt , for some qt > 0, t = 1, 2, ..; i = 1, ..., n;
and
(P .2) (i ) and (ii ).
Given e ∈ E , we define an interior Walrasian Competitive Equilibrium with
perfect foresight for e as the pair of prices and net trade allocations (p, z ), where
p = (p1, p2, ..., pt , ...) > 0˜, and z = (z 1, ..., z n ), such that:
[D .1] For each i = 1, 2, ...n, z i + wi solves the following program:
max V i (z i + wi )
s.t .
∑∞
t=1 pt (z it + wit ) =
∑∞
t=1 ptw
i
t
z it + w
i
t ≥ 0, t = 1, 2, ...,
[D .2] Feasibility condition:
n∑
i=1
z it = 0˜t , t = 1, 2, ...,
Alternatively, we may say that (p, z ) constitutes an interior Walrasian Com-
petitive Equilibrium with perfect foresight for e whenever z ∈ P+(e), and
(P .3) ∑∞t=1 pt z it = 0 i = 1, ..., n.
Notice that if we identify qt = pt , conditions (P .1) and (P .3) are the usual
first order conditions derived from the maximization of the i − th consumer
utility function under his budget constraint, and 1/αi is the Lagrange multiplier
of such a maximization program. Conditions (i ) and (ii ) are respectively the
non-negativity condition for consumption allocations and market clearing at each
time. We denote by
W : E → F (E )
the Walrasian correspondence, which associates to each economy e the set of
Walrasian trade allocations for e, W (e) ⊆ F (e). Furthermore, we denote by
Wt : E → Ft (E )
the Walrasian trade allocations at time t = 1, 2, ..., where Ft (E ) ⊆ R is the set
of all feasible allocations at time t = 1, 2, ..., for some economy e ∈ E .
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3 Informationally decentralized mechanisms
In this section we state, for the case of two agents3, some well known definitions
and results from the classical theory of decentralization (see Hurwicz, 1986, or
Aizpurua and Manresa, 1993, for a proof of the Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 3.1
stated in this section).
Following the Mount and Reiter 1984 framework, we define a mechanism,
or a process, on E as a triple π =< M , µ, h > where M is the message set,
µ : E → M is the equilibrium correspondence, and h : M → F (E ) is the
outcome function.
The property of informational decentralization for a mechanism is a very im-
portant one for this theory. It says that every agent only knows a priori her/his
own characteristics. So, agents should make decisions based only on the infor-
mation transmitted by other agents, through the message set, and the knowledge
they have about their own characteristics. A formalization of this property is
given by the following definition.
We say that π is an informationally decentralized mechanism if there exist
some individual equilibrium correspondences, µi : E i → M , such that
µ(e) = µ1(e1) ∩ µ2(e2) for all e ∈ E .
Let H : E → F (E ) be a performance correspondence. We say that the
mechanism π realizes H over E whenever φ /= h(µ(e)) ⊆ H (e) for all e ∈ E ,
where φ is the empty set.
Given a performance standard, a traditional question that this theory has been
asking is to determine the minimal informational size of the message set of any
decentralized mechanism that realizes such a performance correspondence.
The theory defines a partial order among all possible message sets of a mecha-
nism, as a relative measure of their informational size, by adopting the concept of
the Fre´chet ordering for topological spaces (defined below), which corresponds
to the dimensionality of the space, when such dimension exists. Theorem 3.1
gives us a general statement in order to find a lower bound for the size of the
message set of a mechanism that realizes a given performance. It turns out that a
critical step to apply such a Theorem to a particular case consist, first in finding
a certain subset of the set of economies (called with the uniqueness property),
where the performance function behaves in some particular way, and then use
the result called the single valuedness lemma. In what follows we give precise
statements for our previous informal discussion of the theory.
We say that E∗ ⊆ E has the uniqueness property with respect to H , whenever
e, e˜ ∈ E∗,
H (e) ∩ H (e1, e˜2) ∩ H (e˜1, e2) ∩ H (e˜) /= φ, imply e = e˜.
Lemma 3.1. (The single-valuedness lemma).
3 For the case of n agents, see Hurwicz(1986).
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Let π =< M , µ, h > be an informationally decentralized mechanism, which
realizes H over E . Let E∗ ⊆ E have the uniqueness property with respect to H .
Then, the restriction of µ to E∗, that is µ|E∗ , is an injective correspondence (i.e.
µ|E∗ (e) ∩ µ|E∗ (e˜) = φ for all e /= e˜, e˜,e ∈ E∗).
Let E and M be topological spaces. A mechanism π is called regular if µ : E ′
→ M is a spot threaded correspondence (i.e. there is some open set E ′ ⊆ E and
some continuous function f : E ′ → M such that f (e) ∈ µ(e) for all e ∈ E ′).
A topological space T is said to have the weak local similarity property at
an open subset U of T whenever there exist some V ⊆ U which, in the relative
topology, is homeomorphic to T . We say that T has the strong local similarity
property at U whenever every open subset U ′ ⊆ U has a subset V ′ ⊆ U ′ which,
in the relative topology, is homeomorphic to T .
Let M1 and M2 be two topological spaces. We say that M1 has as much
information as M2 whenever there exists a subspace M ′1 of M1 which is homeo-
morphic to M2. This definition corresponds to the so called Fre´chet ordering for
topological spaces, written M1 ≥F M2.
Theorem 3.2. Let E and M be topological spaces, and let π = < M , µ, h >
be an informationally decentralized mechanism realizing H : E → A over E .Let
E∗ ⊆ E be a subspace of E having the uniqueness property with respect to H .
Let µ be spot-threaded with spot domain at the open subset U ⊆ E∗. Then M
≥F E∗ if either of the following two conditions is satisfied:
(a) M and E∗ are Hausdorff spaces, E∗ is locally compact and has the
strong local similarity property at U .
(b) [µ|E∗ ]−1 is continuous on µ(U ) and E∗ has the weak local similarity
property at U .
4 Results
In this section we present the results of the paper. We consider first a particular
class of economies satisfying (A.1) and (A.2), with two agents and one consumer
good at each period. We investigate some properties of the Walrasian correspon-
dence, the Pareto efficient, and the individually rational correspondences at time
one. That is the allocation that each agent receives at the first period of time.
This means that we restrict the allocation space of those correspondences to the
plane. Formally, we let4
W1 : E 1 × E 2 → F1(E )
denote the Walrasian correspondence at period one, where W1(e) is the Walrasian
allocation for e at time one, and F1(E ) denotes the set of all feasible trade
allocations at time one.
4 See definition of Ft and Wt on p. 61.
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The particular class of economies that we consider are those satisfying (A.1)
and (A.2), where
ui (x ) = ln x , i = 1, 2; and w1t + w2t = 1, t = 1, 2, ...
This means that each agent i = 1, 2 is now characterized only by the pair
ei = (ai , wi ).We now define a class of environments for which the unique Pareto
optimal and individually rational allocation is the no trade allocation sequence,
that is z = (0˜, 0˜).
Let α1 > 0, and α2 > 0 be given, and for each e1 = (a1, w1) ∈ E 1 consider
the mapping
Λ : E 1 → E 2 defined by
Λ(e1) =
{
α1
α2
(1−w1t )
w1t
a1t = a
2
t , t = 1, 2, ...
1− w1t = w2t , t = 1, 2, ...
We define E = E 1 × E 2 = {(e1, e2) ∈ E 1 × E 2 : e2 = Λ(e1)}.
Lemma 4.1. The unique allocation that is Pareto optimal and individually ratio-
nal for each e ∈ E is the zero net trade.
Proof. (See Appendix).
We now define a subclass of environments which has the uniqueness property
with respect to W1. Let a∗ be a given sequence of discount factors (i.e., a∗t > 0,
and
∑
a∗t < +∞ ), and let w ∈ R+ be such that 0 < w < 1. Let E∗ be defined
as :
E∗ =
{(e1, e2) ∈ E : a1t = a∗t , t = 1, 2, ..., and w1t = w for t = 1} .
Hence, we are taking those economies in E where the first agent has a fixed
sequence of discount factors, and a fixed endowment only at time t = 1. It is
very easy to see that E∗ can be taken as the set of all sequences with values in
the interval [a, b], with their first element being the constant w.
Lemma 4.2. The set E∗ has the uniqueness property with respect to the perfor-
mance correspondence W1.
Proof. (See Appendix).
We now state the first result of this paper, Theorem 4.3, which can be in-
terpreted in the following way. Consider a pure exchange economy with two
agents living forever and one good per period. Suppose that at some period of
time, say t = 1, they make some exchanges. What our next result shows is that
to identify such a trade as an intertemporal Walrasian trade, for the two agents,
the information that they will have to transmit involves an infinite number of
linearly independent variables, provided that a priori each agent only knows his
own characteristics.
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Theorem 4.3. Let π =< M , µ, h > be a regular informationally decentralized
mechanism, which realizes W1 : E 1 × E 2 → F1(E ). If µ has spot domain at an
open subset U ⊆ E∗, and either: (a) M is a Hausdorff space, or (b) [µ|E∗ ]−1 is
a continuous function on µ[U ], then M ≥F [a, b]z+, ([a, b]z+ is the space of all
real sequences taking values in [a, b], with the product topology).
Proof. (See Appendix).
Consider the subset of economies Ê ⊆ E where each agent i = 1, 2, ..., n,
has characteristics ê = (â i , û i , ŵi ) ∈ Ê i with the following properties:
(A.3) û i : R+ → R satisfies that for each x ∈ R++ we have
∑
k=1
Dk ûi (x ) · xk = ci for some ci > 0.
(A.4) Given any bounded sequence of total endowments for the econ-
omy, ŵ = (ŵ1, ŵ2, ..., ŵt , ...) with ŵt ∈ R++, we assume that for each
t = 1, 2, ..., agents’ endowments satisfies:
ŵit = s
iwt , with 0 < si < 1 and
n∑
i=1
si = 1 .
(A.5) Discount factors are normalized so that
∞∑
t=1
aˆ it = 1.
The last assumption, (A.5), is really innocuous, since it does not change
agents’ preferences at all. The assumption (A.4) says that every agent has a
constant share of the total endowment of the economy at every period of time.
Condition (A.3) is satisfied in general by the following family of utility functions:
û i (x ) = ci ln x1 + Ψ i (ln x1
x2
, ln x1
x3
, ..., ln x1
x
) + const .
where Ψ i : R−1+ → R is an arbitrary twice continuously differentiable function.
It should be noted that when there is only one good at each period of time, the
unique, up to a constant, utility function that satisfies condition (A.3) is the ln
function. As we will see at the end of this section, both (A.3) and (A.4) are key
conditions for the next Theorem 4.4 be true.
For the set of economies, called Ê , that we have just described, we can state
the following result.
Theorem 4.4. Let ê = (ê1, ..., ên ) ∈ Ê 1 × · · · × Ê n be an economy satisfying
(A.1) − (A.5). Suppose that for each t = 1, 2, ..., we have that (pt , z t ), pt ∈ R++
and z t = (z 1t , ..., z nt ) ∈ Rn satisfies the following conditions:
[Dt .1] for each i ,(z it + ŵit ) ≥ 0 solves the program:
max â it û
i (x it )
s.t . pt x it = â it s i
x it ≥ 0, t = 1, 2, ...,
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[D .2] Feasibility condition:
n∑
i=1
z it = 0, t = 1, 2, ...,
Then (pt , z t )∞t=1 ≡ (p, z ) constitutes a Walrasian Competitive Equilibrium with
perfect foresight for the economy ê.
Proof. (See Appendix).
The previous result tells us that it is possible to achieve a Walrasian Compet-
itive Equilibrium with perfect foresight by means of period by period competitive
equilibrium as long as we restrict our environment to the subset Ê of economies.
Within these economies now every agent can identify a Walrasian trade alloca-
tion at each time t , say z t,by looking at the feasibility condition [D .2], and by
checking if his t consumption allocation, (z it + ŵit ), solves his utility maximiza-
tion problem at t , that is condition [Dt .1]. Such a condition says that agent i
chooses his t−consumption bundle at time t by maximizing his t−utility func-
tion, ât ui (x it ), subject to his budget constraint at time t .The income that the i th
agent spent at each time is a fraction (by assumption (A.5)), â it ,of the total in-
come that the agents has along his entire life, which is, by assumption (A.4),
si ,since prices are normalized so that
∞∑
t=1
pt ŵt = 1.
It should also be pointed out that the consumers problem at t only depends
upon each agents characteristics at time t . Hence, we may say that the period
by period competitive price mechanism, just described, realizes the Walrasian
correspondence. We can formalize this statement within the mechanism design
framework by using some definitions.
For each t , let πt = < Mt , µt , ht > be the t− period competitive mechanism,
defined as follows.
The message space is:
Mt = {((z 1t , z 2t , ..., z nt ), pt ) ∈ Rn × R++ :
n∑
i=1
z it = 0}, and so messages are
mt = (zt , pt ) ∈ Mt .
Let the equilibrium correspondence µt : Et → Mt be µt (e) =
n⋂
i=1
µit (eit ), where:
µit (eit ) = {mt ∈ Mt : (z it +wit ) is a solution to the i − th consumer problem
[Dt .1] at prices pt}.
For each m ∈ µt (e), which is an equilibrium message for the mechanism, we
let ht (m) = z t .
Once we have defined πt we state without proving the following result, which
is a corollary to the previous theorem.
Can we identify Walrasian allocations? 67
Corollary 4.5. The informationally decentralized mechanism πt =< Mt , µt , ht >
, t = 1, 2, ..., realizes the Walrasian correspondence at each time t :
Wt : E → Ft (E )
on the environments E = Ê . In other words, for each ê ∈ Ê ,
ht (µt (êt )) ∈ Wt (ê), t = 1, 2, ...,
Our next result tell us how important are our assumptions (A.3) and (A.4) in
Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.6. Let ê = (ê1, ê2, ..., ên ) ∈ E 1 × E 2 × ... × E n be an economy,
satisfying (A.2) and (A.5),and let (pt , z t )∞t=1be an interior Walrasian Competitive
Equilibrium with perfect foresight for e.
Then, we have that for each i = 1, 2, ..., n and t = 1, 2, ..., x it = (z it +wit ) ≥
0 is a solution to the program [Dt.1] :
Max âit û i (x it )
s.t . pt x it = I
i
t
x it ≥ 0, t = 1, 2, ...,
where (A.4′) I it = â it s i and si = (
∞∑
t=1
ptwit )/(
∞∑
t=1
ptwt ),
if and only if:
(A.3′)
∑
k=1
Dk ûi (x it ) · x it = ci for all t = 1, 2, 3, ...and some ci > 0.
Proof. (See Appendix).
The “only if ” part of the Theorem 4.6 says that if any given Walrasian
Competitive Equilibrium for a given economy can be achieved through a period
by period consumers maximization program like [Dt.1] in Theorem 4.4, then
it has to be in economies where (A.3) is satisfied at equilibrium, that is what
condition (A.3′) in Theorem 4.6 says. We should say that ci may vary from one
equilibrium to another in economies with more than one. From this point of view
we say that (A.3) characterizes the economies where Theorem 4.4 holds.
The “if ” part of the result can be seen as the converse of Theorem 4.4, and
it says that any Walrasian Competitive Equilibrium for an economy satisfying
(A.3′) must necessarily solve a period by period consumer program like [Dt.1].
We should point out that si ,in Theorem 4.6, is the total amount of income that
agent i receives at the Walrasian Competitive Equilibrium, once we normalize
to one unit the equilibrium value of the total income of the economy. We should
here stress the fact that in general any consumer i will need to know the entire
infinite sequence of equilibrium prices in order to know the value of si . However
in economic environments, where (A.4) is satisfied, the value of si is always
known at any period of time and it is independent of the Walrasian equilibrium
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prices for the economy. This is why assumption (A.4) is important for Theorem
4.4.
It is also important to note that the class of economies that we consider
in Theorem 4.2 satisfy (A.3) but they don’t satisfy (A.4) when we consider the
“cross-economies” (e, e˜).This also illustrates the importance of assumption (A.4).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown, under the hypothesis of informational decentraliza-
tion, that for infinite horizon pure exchange economies it is not possible, except
for certain sets of economies that we characterize, to identify a walrasian equilib-
rium trade at a given period of time unless the agents have an infinite dimensional
information set.
The interpretation of this result, in the classical intertemporal framework of an
Arrow-Debreu economy, is that all agents need to know that all future markets
are at equilibrium, or equivalently they must have perfect foresight about all
equilibrium prices, in order to be sure that any particular present trading is an
equilibrium trade.
An implication of this informational result is just to point out the lack of
realism of such an equilibrium concept from the positive point of view of a
theory that aims at explaining some stylized facts. In fact this and other kind of
criticisms of that concept (see for instance Starr 1987) is what justifies, among
others reasons, the importance of other types of equilibrium notions such as, for
instance, that of Temporary equilibrium, developed by Grandmont and, from a
more dynamic perspective, the Radner equilibrium. Such equilibrium concepts
lower the information requirements of agents, at any point in time, to a finite
set of variables but from a normative point of view it is difficult to recommend
those concepts. One way to proceed from this situation is, as we do here, by
setting a performance standard social welfare correspondence and look for a de-
centralized mechanism which realizes such an objective in a set of environments
and with a finite number of variables at each equilibrium point of time. That
is the kind of result that we obtain in Theorems 4.4 and 4.6, where we show a
set of environments and a decentralized mechanism which realizes intertemporal
Walrasian outcomes by means of a sequence of equilibria corresponding to a
sequence of economies and where agents only use a finite number of variables.
I believe that this approach can give us some method and discipline to evaluate
dynamic equilibrium notions both from a normative point of view and also from
a positive one.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let e ∈ E be given. Let ẑ = (ẑ 1, ẑ 2) ∈ P+(e) and individ-
ually rational. Hence, it follows from condition (P .1) that
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α̂1a1t
w1t + ẑ
1
t
=
α̂2a2t
w2t + ẑ
2
t
, t = 1, 2, 3, ... (1)
for some α̂1, α̂2 > 0. Let β > 0 be such that α̂ = α̂2/α̂1 = α·β,where α = α2/α1
is the ratio of α1 > 0, and α2 > 0,which we used in the definition of E .Then (1)
becomes:
a1t
w1t + ẑ
1
t
a2t
w2t + ẑ
2
t
= α · β = β ·
a1t
w1t
a2t
w2t
,
therefore, we obtain:
w2t + ẑ
2
t
w1t + ẑ
1
t
= β
w2t
w1t
,
and substituting ẑ 2t = −ẑ 1t in the last expression, we obtain that
ẑ 1t =
w2t · w1t (1− β)
(βw2t + w1t )
. (2)
If β < 1, we have from (2) that ẑ 1t > 0 for all t = 1, 2, ...., and the individually
rational condition is violated. Similarly, if β > 1, then ẑ 1t < 0, leading condition
(1) to a contradiction. Therefore, β = 1, which implies that ẑ 1t = ẑ 2t = 0 for all t .
Clearly, ẑ = (0˜, 0˜) is individually rational, and it is a Pareto Optimal allocation
for e, since we may take
qt =
α1a1t
w1t
=
α2a2t
w2t
unionsq
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Let e = (e1, e2) ∈ E∗, and let e˜ = (e˜1, e˜2) ∈ E∗. Assume
that there exists some z1 = (z 11 , z 21 ) such that
z1 ∈ W1(e1, e2) (3)
z1 ∈ W1(e˜1, e˜2) (4)
z1 ∈ W1(e1, e˜2) (5)
z1 ∈ W1(e˜1, e2) . (6)
We have to show that e˜ = e. Since every walrasian allocation is Pareto
Optimal and individually rational, by Lemma 4.1 we have that z1 = (0, 0), since
e˜, e ∈ E .
For any given economy e ∈ E , the walrasian allocation for each t is given
by the following expressions
z 1t =
 1
1 +
α2a2t
α1a1t
− w1t (7)
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z 2t =
 1
1 +
α2a1t
α1a2t
− w2t (8)
where α2/α1 =
∑
t w
1
t a
2
t /
∑
t w
2
t a
1
t .
In particular, we consider (7) at t = 1, and for the particular economies we
are dealing with, and taking into account that z1 = (0, 0), we obtain the following
expressions from (3) through (6) respectively,
a11
w11
=
[∑
t w
2
t a
1
t∑
t w
1
t a
2
t
]
· a
2
1
w21
(9)
a˜11
w˜11
=
[∑
t w˜
2
t a˜
1
t∑
t w˜
1
t a˜
2
t
]
· a˜
2
1
w˜21
(10)
a11
w˜11
=
[∑
t w˜
2
t a
1
t∑
t w
1
t a˜
2
t
]
· a˜
2
1
w˜21
(11)
a11
w11
=
[∑
t w˜
2
t a
1
t∑
t w
1
t a˜
2
t
]
· a˜
2
1
w˜21
. (12)
Since α = α2/α1 is fixed and given by the definition of E∗, and a11 = a∗1 ,
and w11 = w,we have that a˜21 = a21, and w˜21 = w21. Therefore, from (9) and (10)
we obtain: ∑
t w
2
t a
1
t∑
t w
1
t a
2
t
=
∑
t w˜
2
t a˜
1
t∑
t w˜
1
t a˜
2
t
, (13)
and from (9) and (11) we obtain:∑
t w
2
t a
1
t∑
t w
1
t a
2
t
=
∑
t w˜
2
t a
1
t∑
t w
1
t a˜
2
t
, (14)
and from (10) and (11) we obtain:∑
t w˜
2
t a˜
1
t∑
t w˜
1
t a˜
2
t
=
∑
t w
2
t a˜
1
t∑
t w˜
1
t a
2
t
. (15)
Taking into account that a1t = a˜1t = a∗t for all t = 1, 2, ..., it follows from (13)
and (14) that ∑
t
w1t a˜
2
t =
∑
t
w˜1t a˜
2
t , (16)
and combining (13) and (15) we also obtain:∑
t
w1t a
2
t =
∑
t
w˜1t a
2
t . (17)
From (16) and (17) we can derive:∑
t
w1t (a˜2t − a2t ) =
∑
t
w˜1t (a˜2t − a2t )
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from which we can obtain∑
t
(w1t − w˜1t )(a˜2t − a2t ) = 0 . (18)
Since,
a˜2t = 1/α · (w˜2t /w˜1t )a∗t , and (19)
a2t = 1/α · (w2t /w1t )a∗t , (20)
we compute
a˜2t − a2t =
1
α
1
w˜1t w
1
t
(w1t − w˜1t )a∗t
which can be substituted into (18) to obtain:∑
t
[w1t − w˜1t ]2 ·
a∗t
αw˜1t w
1
t
= 0
which implies w1t = w˜1t for all t , and consequently w2t = w˜2t . From (13) and (14)
we conclude that a2t = a˜2t for all t . unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We apply Theorem 3.1. Since E∗ has the uniqueness
property with respect W1 and π is informationally decentralized and realizes W1,
we have by the single valuedness lemma that µ|E∗ : E
∗ → M is an injective
correspondence, and hence, [µ|E∗ ]−1 : µ(E
∗) → E∗ is a function. By Proposition
1, in Aizpurua and Manresa 1993, we have that [a, b]z+ , that is the set of all
infinite sequences taking values in [a, b], is a Hausdorff space, is locally compact
and it has the similarity property. A simple application of Theorem 3.1, allows
us to conclude the proof of this one. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4.4. For any given i = 1, 2, ..., n, and for each t = 1, 2, 3, ...
let x it = z it + ŵit be a solution to the program [Dt .1]:
max â it û
i (x it )
s.t . pt x it = si â it t = 1, 2, ...,
x it ≥ 0
we only have to show that {x it}∞t=1 is a solution to the program [D .1]:
max
∞∑
t=1
â it û
i (x it )
s.t .
∞∑
t=1
pt x it =
∞∑
t=1
pt siwt
x it ≥ 0 t = 1, 2, ...,
First we notice, using (A.5) that from program [Dt .1]:
∞∑
t=1
pt x
i
t = s
i
∞∑
t=1
â it = s
i
and so,
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n∑
i=1
(
∞∑
t=1
pt x
i
t ) =
n∑
i=1
si = 1.
Therefore,
∞∑
t=1
pt ŵt =
∞∑
t=1
pt (
n∑
i=1
x it ) = 1.
Hence, if {x it}∞t=1 satisfies the constraint of program [Dt .1] for every t =
1, 2, ..., it also satisfies the constraint of program [D .1]. From the first order
necessary conditions for program [Dt .1] we have that:
â it Dû(x it ) = λit pt for some λit ≥ 0, t = 1, 2, 3, ...
But, by (A.3) ∑
k
Dk û(x it ) · x ik = ci ,for some ci > 0,
and we have that λit = c
i
si
> 0 for all t = 1, 2, ..., . Therefore, letting λi = c
i
si
we
have that x it satisfies:
â it Dû(x it ) = λi pt for all t .
Hence by the of concavity û i (·), {x it}∞t=1 is a solution to program [D .1]. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Let (pt , z t ) be an interior Walrasian Competitive Equilib-
rium satisfying the assumptions of the statement. Then without loss of generality
we may assume that
∞∑
t=1
ptwt = 1. Hence for each i , (x it ) is a solution to the
program:
Max
∑∞
t=1 â
i
t û
i (x it )
s.t .
∑∞
t=1 pt x
i
t = s
i
x it ≥ 0, t = 1, 2, ...
And, by the first order conditions, there exists some λi ≥ 0 such that:
â it Dû
i (x it ) = λi pt ∀t = 1, 2, ..., (21)
and by (A.2) follows that λi > 0.
Now, let x it be a solution to the program [Dt .1]. By the first order conditions
there exists some λit ≥ 0 such that:
â it Dû
i (x it ) = λit pt ∀t = 1, 2, ..., (22)
Hence, combining (21) and (22), it follows that λit = λi > 0 for all t = 1, 2, ...,
By post multiplying both sides of the equality (22) by x it , and using the
constraint of program [Dt .1] we have that:
â it Dû
i (x it ) · x it = λi pt x it = λi â it s i
which implies that:
ci ≡ Dûi (x it ) · x it = λi s i
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for all t = 1, 2, ..., which shows the ”if ” part of the result.
Let’s assume now that (A.3′) holds. Then, we take λit = λi > 0 for all t , and
so the condition (22)is satisfied.
Now, put Î it ≡ pt x t for t = 1, 2, ..., . Then it follows that:
â it Dû
i (x it ) · x it = λi pt x it = λi Î it (23)
adding the previous expression with respect to t up to infinity:
∞∑
t=1
â it Dû
i (x it ) · x it = λi
∞∑
t=1
pt x
i
t = λ
i
∞∑
t=1
Î it
and by (A.5), (A.3′),and since
∞∑
t=1
Î it = si ,we obtain:
ĉi = λi s i > 0.
Taking this expression into account, and (A.3′), it follows from (23) that:
â it s
iλi = λi Î it ,
which implies that Î it = I
i
t = â
i
t s
i for all t = 1, 2, ...,and all i = 1, 2, ..., n. unionsq
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